Fall of Yoon Suk Yeol: Martial Law and Ouster

On the night of December 3, 2024, the lights of the world’s most vibrant high-tech democracy flickered and nearly went out. It began with a sudden, late-night televised address by President Yoon Suk Yeol, delivered not from the traditional halls of the Blue House which he had turned into a public park but from his fortified redoubt in the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan. By the time the broadcast ended, paratroopers were fast-roping from helicopters onto the grounds of the National Assembly, and South Korea was staring into an authoritarian abyss.

What followed was a year-long convulsion: a snap election, a decapitated executive branch, and a judicial reckoning that culminated on February 19, 2026. The transition from the “Yongsan Era” to a life sentence for insurrection represents a tectonic shift in East Asian politics. To understand how a G20 nation survived this earthquake, one must look past the headlines at the five shocking truths revealed in the wake of the crisis.

1. The 190-to-0 Resistance: A Unanimous Defense of Order

The most immediate failure of the December 3 insurrection was the sheer speed and unanimity with which South Korean institutions reasserted the constitutional order. As paratroopers and police forces physically blocked the entrances to the National Assembly, lawmakers scaled fences and smashed through barricades to reach the plenary chamber. At 1:02 AM on December 4, less than three hours after the decree, 190 lawmakers including members of Yoon’s own People Power Party voted unanimously to rescind martial law.

This was not mere political theater; it was the first activation of the nation’s democratic “self-correcting mechanism.” The defense of the realm shifted from the streets to the courtroom, ending on April 4, 2025, when the Constitutional Court upheld the President’s impeachment with an 8–0 decision.

In its landmark ruling, the Court defined the act as an unpardonable breach of the social contract:

“These acts of Respondent in violating the Constitution and statutes represent a betrayal of the people’s trust and constitute grave violations of the law that are unpardonable from the standpoint of protecting the Constitution.”

2. The “Chungam Faction” and the High School Plot

Investigative probes led by Special Counsel Cho Eun-suk revealed that the insurrection was not a broad military conspiracy but a dangerously insular “alumni-centered” plot. The mastermind of the crisis was Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, whose relationship with Yoon Suk Yeol traced back to 1977 at Chungam High School.

Evidence from the trial suggests that this “Chungam Faction” functioned as a shadow chain of command, bypassing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The “smoking gun” emerged in testimony regarding an interview where Kim Yong-hyun gave Yoon the blueprint for his power structure: “If you want to win the election, you need to build a campaign centered around Chungam High School alumni… people who aren’t from the prosecution.” This tribal loyalty network allegedly birthed the martial law decree, proving that in a modern democracy, the greatest threat to stability can sometimes be found in the atavistic ties of a high school yearbook.

3. “Shoot if Necessary”: The Violent Intent Behind the Blockade

While the initial crisis was largely bloodless, later indictments (Source 5 and 6) disclosed a chilling readiness for lethal force. According to court records, between 00:40 and 00:50 on December 4, Yoon allegedly issued explicit orders to Commander Kwak and Capital Defense Commander Lee Jin-woo to “break down the doors, even if it means shooting” to remove lawmakers from the plenary hall.

The insurrection was not just an internal political maneuver; it was a gamble that risked international war. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) provided evidence that the administration launched a drone from Baengnyeongdo into North Korean territory, specifically intending to provoke a military conflict that would justify a sustained “emergency” state. The court identified the following specific insurrectionary actions:

• Targeted Arrests: Orders were issued to arrest and detain rivals including Lee Jae Myung, Speaker Woo Won-shik, and even Han Dong-hoon, the leader of Yoon’s own party.
• Warrantless Assaults: Armed troops conducted a forced search of the National Election Commission, an independent constitutional body.
• Judicial Intimidation: Plans were formulated to track the whereabouts of the former Supreme Court Chief Justice and other senior judges for potential arrest.
• Provocation of Conflict: The manufacturing of a North Korean threat through unauthorized drone deployments to bypass the National Assembly’s rescission of the decree.

4. The Resurrection of Lee Jae Myung: A Landslide Against the Odds

The vacuum left by Yoon’s removal triggered a snap election on June 3, 2025. It resulted in a historic landslide for Lee Jae Myung, whose narrow loss in 2022 had originally set the stage for Yoon’s presidency.

Lee’s victory was a legal and political “rollercoaster.” On May 2, 2025, the Supreme Court had remanded a case against him that threatened to disqualify him from the race. However, in a move that defined the election’s pace, the Seoul High Court postponed his retrial to June 18, 2025 safely after the election. With the PPP in shambles after a “midnight coup” involving its own leadership, Lee secured 49.42% of the general election vote and a staggering 89.77% in his party primary. The 2025 election became less about policy and more a referendum on the “insurrectionist forces” of the previous administration.

5. The Ringleader’s Final Verdict: Life Imprisonment Over Death

On February 19, 2026, Presiding Judge Ji Gwi-yeon delivered the sentence that decapitated the former executive branch. While prosecutors had demanded the death penalty arguing the insurrection threatened the nation’s existence the court opted for life imprisonment. The judge noted a “lack of meticulous planning” and the failure of the coup within six hours as mitigating factors.

However, the sentence remained at the maximum possible level due to what the court called a “total lack of remorse.” Yoon refused to attend 15 consecutive sessions of his trial, holed up first in his residence and later in solitary confinement at the Seoul Detention Center, insisting his actions were a legitimate “act of governance.” The court’s judgment extended beyond Yoon; his Prime Minister, Han Duck-soo, was sentenced to 23 years for aiding the insurrection.

In her final verdict, Judge Ji Gwi-yeon stated:

Conclusion: The Cost of Political Gambling

The 2025 election and the subsequent trials “recreated a history of the State’s abuse of emergency powers,” but in doing so, they also reaffirmed the strength of South Korea’s institutional guardrails. The nation demonstrated that its democracy is not a fragile gift, but a robust system capable of repelling an assault from its own Commander-in-Chief.

Yet, as Lee Jae Myung takes office and the “Yongsan Era” defendants begin their life sentences, the psychological scars remain. The 2025 crisis has fundamentally changed the Korean presidency, stripping it of the last vestiges of imperial authority. The question for the next decade is one of healing: Can a nation truly heal from a betrayal that reached the highest office, or does the precedent of 2025 change the Korean presidency forever?